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THE TRANS-ALASKA PIPELINE AND
STRICT LIABILITY FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE
ALAN G. STONE*
Federal authorization to build a trans-Alaska oil pipeline was the
culmination of a long and frustrating battle in the courts and Congress.
The primary conflict was between satisfying immediate and future
energy needs and protecting property and the environment from
damage. Congress, in favoring immediate and projected energy needs
by enacting the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (Act),' may
have subverted the environmental values established in the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).2 The environmental dangers
evolve not only from the construction of the pipeline, but also from
the potential oil pollution caused by leakage and spillage.
This Note first examines the Trans-Alaska pipeline, its development
and its potential environmental effects. Secondly, it discusses the
strict liability provisions contained in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act
for damage caused by oil pollution. Lastly, the Note examines tradi-
tional oil pollution remedies and proposes the adoption of a general
rule of strict liability for all oil pollution damage caused by the
transportation or storage of oil.
I. THE TRANs-ALAsKA PIPELINE: JUDICIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
In January 1968 Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) discovered
a tremendous petroleum deposit at Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, on the North
Slope of the Brooks Mountain Range. Every major oil company with
leaseholdings on the North Slope rushed to explore the deposit.3 In
September 1969 the oil companies submitted bids to the state for
*B.S., Boston University, 1972; J.D., Washington University, 1975.
1. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-55 (Supp. III, 1973).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
3. In the mid-1960's before any commercial oil discoveries were made on the
North Slope, B.P. (Standard Oil of Ohio), ARCO and Exxon paid 12 million
dollars for state leases covering 90% of the Prudhoe Bay Reservoir in northern
Alaska. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1973, § 6 (Magazine), at 100 [hereinafter cited as
N.Y. Times Mag.].
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179 tracts of land totaling 450,000 acres. 4 As a result of this single
competitive sale of drilling rights on the North Slope, Alaska received
over 900 million dollars.5
When subsequent drilling uncovered major reserves of crude oil
preliminary studies were undertaken to determine the most desirable
system for transporting the oil from the North Slope to primary
markets in the lower forty-eight states. Interested oil companies
considered the use of ice-breaking tankers to penetrate the Northwest
Passage to the East Coast,6 railroad cars traveling to Prudhoe Bay
via an extension of the Alaska Railroad,7 submarine tankers,8 a large
diameter pipeline through Alaska and Canada into the Midwest,g
and a pipeline carrying oil through Alaska to one of several seaports
for further shipments via tanker to the West Coast. 10 In June 1969
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), a group of oil companies
with North Slope holdings,"' applied to the Bureau of Land Manage-
4. See T. BROWN, OIL ON ICE 29 (1971).
5. Morehouse & Harrison, State Government and Economic Development in
Alaska, in ALASKA PUBLIC POLICY 31 (G. Harrison ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited
as ALASKA PUBLIC POLICY). Alaska is expected to receive more than 300 million
dollars per year from commercial oil production in the late 1970's. Id. For a
discussion of the benefits to Alaska and its residents from petroleum development
and pipeline construction see A. TusSING, ALASKA PIPELINE REPORT 69-101
(1971); Tussing, Oil and Alaska's Economy, in ALASKA PUBLIC POLICY, supra,
at 167-72; Norgaard, Petroleum Development in Alaska: Prospects and Con-
flicts, 12 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 83, 89-96 (1972).
6. In 1968 the Humble Oil and Refining Co. converted the Manhattan, a
115,000 ton tanker, into the world's most powerful icebreaker; it then plowed
through the Arctic ice from the North Slope to the East. T. BROWN, supra note
4, at 86-87.
7. ALASKA PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 5, at 32.
8. Id.
9. Report by the Standard Oil Co. (Apr. 19, 1973), in Hearings on H.R.
9130 Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the House Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 328 (1973).
10. Id.
11. To deal effectively with problems that arose between the Department of
the Interior and the State of Alaska, the oil companies dissolved TAPS and
established the Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. as a single legal entity to build and
operate the pipeline. The seven participating oil companies and their proportionate
contributions to the pipeline's cost are: Standard Oil of Ohio 28.08%; Atlantic
Richfield (ARCO), 28.08%; Exxon, 25.52%; Mobil, 8.68%; Phillips Petroleum,
3.32%; Union Oil, 3.32%; Amerada Hess, 3%. Loehwing, Alaska's North Slope
Oil Afen Are Getting Ready to TAP Its Riches, Barron's, Apr. 8, 1974, at 3
[hereinafter cited as Barron's].
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ment for right-of-way pennits2 to build a pipeline and a haul road
through Alaska to the ice-free port of Valdez.' 3
Concerned environmentalists viewed the project as an environmental
and ecological nightmare and, following the enactment of NEPA14
in December 1969, challenged construction of the pipeline. In March
1970 two lawsuits were filed to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior
from issuing permits for construction of the pipeline and the haul
road.,- In April 1970 the district court granted preliminary injunc-
tions on the ground that the three applications for permits, when
12. TAPS filed three applications: for a pipeline right-of-way, for a special
land use permit for additional construction space, and for a haul road right-of-
way. See 2 Y. YANNACONE & B. COHEN, ENVIRONMIENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
220 (1971) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRON'IENTAL RIGHTS].
The TAPS applications for right-of-way permits (June 1969) lacked engineering
details and failed to mention basic environmental problems. The Department of
the Interior's Task Force responded with a long list of questions about the design
of the pipeline and its environmental impact. See Hearings on the Status of the
Propored Trans-Alaska Pipeline Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairq, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 103ff (1969).
13. Initial plans were to extract 600,000 barrels of crude oil per day from the
Prudhoe Bay field as soon as the Trans-Alaska pipeline began operation. (According
to the present schedule, oil -will begin to flow by the third or fourth quarter of
1977,) By 1980 the industry expects to use the full two million barrel per day
czpacty of the pipeline (about 700 million barrels per year). The official esti-
mate of crude oil reserves in Prudhee Bay is 10 to 15 billion barrels. See Nor-
gaard, supra note 5, at 85: Barron's, supra note 11, at 3. See also TiuE, Apr.
I, 1974, at 20, 23 (discussing plans for a giant trans-Canadian pipeline to carry
natural gas from the North Slope into and throughout the United States).
With an initial capacity of 700,000 barrels per day, the original estimated cost
of the TAPS project was 900 million dollars. As more became known about the
size of the Prudhoe Bay reservoir, additional pumping stations added to the design
raised the capacity to two million barrels per day and the cost to 1.5 billion dollars.
In 1973 the cost soared to 3.6 billion dollars, with 500 million dollars attributable
to design changes made in the interest of environmental safety. N.Y. Times Mag.,
Mupra note 3, at 92. The current official estimate by Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.
is 4.5 billion dollars, and it is estimated that the cost may climb still higher.
Barron's, supra note 11, at 3.
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
15. Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970) (suit by
Friends of the Earth, Wilderness Society, and Environmental Defense Fund);
Allakaket v. Hickel, Civil No. 706-70, 1 ENVMONTENTAL L. RPTR. 65021 (D.D.C.
1970) (suit by Alaskan Natives for injunction against issuance of the haul road
permit over land they were claiming in a land claim bill then pending before
Congress). For a discussion of the Alaska land claim dispute see Block, Alaskan
Native Claims, 4 NATURAL RESOURCES L. 223 (1971). The dispute was settled
by the enactment of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§
!601-24 (1971).
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treated as a single application for a pipeline right-of-way, exceeded
the width limitation established in section 28 of the Mineral Leasing
Act of 1920.16 The court also found that the Department of the
Interior had not complied with various procedural provisions of
NEPA.17 Thereafter, in January 1971 the Secretary of the Interior
submitted and circulated a preliminary environmental impact state-
ment and held hearings in compliance with NEPA. Shortly after the
issuance of a final environmental impact statement in March 1972,18
Secretary Morton announced his intention to approve the project.19
The district court then dissolved the preliminary injunction, ruling
that the environmental impact statement complied with NEPA and
that the requirements of the Mineral Leasing Act had been satisfied.2
Plaintiff-environmentalists appealed this ruling emphasizing the Secre-
tary's failure to give adequate consideration to alternatives to the pro-
posed pipeline as required by NEPA. 21
In Wilderness Society v. Mortonl2 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia reversed the district court ruling
and enjoined the Secretary of the Interior from issuing the right-of-
way for pipeline construction. The court held that the Secretary of
16. 41 Stat. 449, as amended, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970) (statute reproduced
in pertinent part at note 27 infra); Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp.
422, 424 (D.D.C. 1970). The court issued preliminary injunctions against
authorization of haul road permits and against the use of gravel from federal
lands to build the road. The court ruled that the haul road and pipeline were
one project and could not be separated for the purpose of compliance with NEPA.
Id. at 424.
17. Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422, 424 (1970). NEPA requires
a detailed environmental impact statement on the proposed project, broad circula-
tion of the statement, and review and public hearings by the Council on Environ-
mental Quality. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4332 (1970); 38 Fed. Reg.
20550 (1973); 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971).
18. The Department of the Interior's initial environmental impact statement
on the Trans-Alaska pipeline was 200 pages long and was considered so super-
ficial that it was withdrawn in response to criticism from the press and Congress.
NATiON, June 11, 1973, at 748 [hereinafter cited as NATiON]. The final environ-
mental impact statement was 3500 pages long. Id.
19. N.Y. Times, May 12, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
20. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 846 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 917 (1973); N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1972, at 11, col. 1.
21. Plaintiff's Brief on NEPA Issues, Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, Civil Action
No. 928-70, in Hearings on H.R. 9130 Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of
the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 2, at
996, 1047 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Brief].
22. 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973).
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the Interior had violated the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 by issuing
special use permits in excess of the width limitation and declared
that the legislature, not the courts, must alter the right-of-way width
limitation before permits could be issued.23 The court declined to
rule, however, on whether the Secretary had complied with the re-
quirements of NEPA and on the adequacy of the final environmental
impact statement. In light of the "contingency of legislative action
modifying the Mineral Leasing Act so as to permit construction of
the pipeline,"24 the "NEPA issues . . . are not ripe for adjudication
at the present time."25
Congress responded in November 1973 with the enactment of the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act.26 Title I of the Act repealed
the pipeline right-of-way restrictions of the Mineral Leasing Act2r
thereby eliminating the basis of the Wilderness Society decision.28
Title II of the Act, authorizing the issuance of rights-of-way and
construction of the pipeline,29 was enacted "to permit the construc-
23. Id. at 892.
24. Id. at 890.
25. Id. at 889-90. "It is obvious the present litigation involves 'a lively con-
flict between antagonistic demands,' but we question whether resolution of the
NEPA issues presented . . . will have any practical significance. To pass upon
the issues in this context would be to decide a mere abstract question of law."
Id. citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 528 (1961).
26. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1631-55 (Supp. III, 1973).
27. Compare Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 § 28(d), 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970)
(act prior to Wilderness decision), which provided in pertinent part:
Rights-of-way through the public lands . . . may be granted by the Secretary
of the Interior for pipeline purposes for the transportation of oil or natural
gas . . . , to the extent of the ground occupied by the said pipeline and
twenty-five feet on each side of the same under such regulations and condi-
tions as to survey, location, application, and use as may be prescribed by the
Secretary....
with 30 U.S.C. § 185 (Supp. III, 1973), amending § 28 of the Mineral Leasing
Act of 1920: "(d) The width of a right-of-way shall not exceed fifty feet plus
the ground occupied by the pipeline (that is, the pipe and related facilities)
unless the Secretary or agency head finds . . . that in his judgment a wider
right-of-way is necessary for operation and maintenance after construction, or to
protect the environment or public safety."
28. S. REP. No. 93-207, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1973). Another report states:
"The need for an amendment of the law is urgent. If the Nation's growing energy
requirements are to be met and if the crippling fuel shortages increasingly being
experienced are to be avoided, Federal legislation to provide the additional
authority required by, and to eliminate the uncertainty that flows from, the
court's decisions must be enacted." H.R. REP. No. 93-414, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
9 (1973) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 93-414].
29. 43 U.S.C. § 1652 (Supp. III, 1973).
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tion of the proposed Trans-Alaskan Oil Pipeline without further
delay."30 The environmental issues were resolved by a congressional
determination that the construction of the Trans-Alaska pipeline was
in the national interest,3' and that the environmental impact state-
ment prepared by the Department of the Interior complied with
NEPA. 2 The Act precludes further judicial review of any environ-
mental challenges to the pipeline under NEPA. 33
30. H.R. REP. No. 93-414, supra note 28, at 10-11. The Act states that the
"purpose of this chapter is to insure that, because of the extensive governmental
studies already made of this project and the national interest in early delivery of
North Slope oil to domestic markets, the trans-Alaska oil pipeline be constructed
promptly without further administrative or judicial delay or impediment." 43
U.S.C. § 1652(a) (Supp. III, 1973). Early development and delivery of Alaskan
oil to domestic markets was also "in the national interest because of growing domestic
shortages and increasing dependence upon insecure foreign sources." Id. § 1651(a).
31. H.R. REP. No. 93-414, supra note 28, at 10-11; see note 30 supra.
32. See H.R. REP. No. 93-414, supra note 28, at 14, 16-17. See also 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1652(b), (d) (Supp. III, 1973).
33. Actions necessary for construction and completion of the Trans-Alaska
pipeline were to be taken without further action under NEPA. 43 U.S.C. §
1652(d) (Supp. III, 1973). The Act further provides that litigation raising
constitutional questions or challenging federal agency actions as ultra vires to Title
II would be barred unless filed within 60 days of the action at issue. I'd.
Congress could legitimately authorize construction of the Trans-Alaska pipeline,
despite the failure of any court to determine the sufficiency of the final environ-
mental impact statement. Congress has the constitutional power "to dispose of
and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property
belonging to the United States." U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2, cI. 2. In United States
v. City & County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, rehearing denied, 310 U.S. 657
(1940), the Court explained that, under this clause "the power over public lands
thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations. . . . Congress may constitu-
tionally limit the disposition of the public domain to a manner consistent with
its views of public policy." 310 U.S. at 29, 30. See also Light v. United States,
220 U.S. 523 (1911); United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 538
(1840).
Indeed, in Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 891 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973), the court of appeals specifically conceded Congress'
power to regulate authorization for right-of-way and construction of the pipeline:
Congress, by enacting Section 28, allowed pipeline companies to use a certain
amount of land to construct their pipelines. These companies have now come
into court . . . and have said, "This is not enough land; give us more." We
have no more power to grant their request . . . than we have the power to
increase congressional appropriations to needy recipients. ". . . The power
over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations. 'And
it is not for the courts to say how that trust shall be administered. That is
for Congress to determine.' " ....
The jurisdictional restrictions on judicial review of agency actions are more
troublesome. Congress possesses the power to limit the jurisdiction of inferior
federal courts and state courts applying federal law. See Lockerty v. Phillips, 319
[Vol. 9:179
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Concern was expressed that authorizing the Secretary to grant the
rights-of-way without meeting NEPA standards creates a dangerous
precedent for noncompliance with NEPA's mandate to consider sig-
nificant alternatives to proposed federal actions. 3  Secretary Morton,
however, contended that the Act should not be interpreted as prece-
(lent for exemptions from judicial review but as an "exceptional and
practical solution" to meeting short-term energy needs. 35 The Secre-
tary's contention, however, ignores the clear effect of the exemption.
It is one thing for the Environmental Protection Agency to issue
temporary exceptions permitting increased pollution to ease winter
fuel shortages;30 it is quite another to allow construction of a perma-
nent Trans-Alaska pipeline that may have serious long-term adverse
environmental effects. It is precisely such undertakings that demand
full compliance with NEPA requirements if NEPA is to be "the most
important and far-reaching environmental and conservation measure
ever enacted by Congress." 37
By eliminating the need to consider alternatives to the Trans-
Alaska pipeline, particularly the alternate trans-Canadian route,38
U.S. 182, 187 (1943); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845). See
geneyall' H. HART & H. WECHSLER, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
288-312 (1953), C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 22-26 (3d ed. 1971); Eisenberg,
Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE
L.J. 498 (1974). Congress, however, must not exercise its power to give, with-
hold or restrict jurisdiction "so as to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law or to take private property without just compensa-
tion." Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948), quoted in, Faulkner v. Clifford, 289 F. Supp. 895,
899 (E,D.N.Y. 1968).
Arguably, the jurisdictional limitations imposed in the Act constitute uncon-
stitutional restrictions on the right of parties, aggrieved by the administrative
action, to procedural due process in granting the pipeline rights-of-way. See H.R.
Rrp. No. 93-414, supra note 28, at 74-76. But see Dominick & Brody, The Alaska
Pipeline: Wilderness Society v. Morton and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authoriza-
twn Act, 23 Ax. U.L. RLv. 337, 366-70 (1973).
34. H.R. REP. No. 93-414, supra note 28, at 69-70.
35. 4 ENVIRONMENT RPTR. CURRENT DEVS. 574 (1973).
36. Id. at 1098, 1177; cf. Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act
of 1974 § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 791, amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857, which amends the
Clean Air Act to permit temporary suspension of emission limitations.
37. 115 CoNG. REc. 40,616 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson in support of
the passage of NEPA).
38. A major argument throughout the pipeline dispute has been the alleged
failure of the Department to consider adequately the trans-Canadian route alterna-
tive. The trans-Canadian pipeline would cut across Canada, through the Mac-
kenzie Delta and Edmonton, into Chicago and the Midwest. Proponents of this
1975]
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Congress may have opened the door to further erosion of NEPA
whenever sufficient political or economic pressure is applied. 0
II. Ti PIPELINE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Congress approved the Department of the Interior's final environ-
mental impact statement and authorized the construction of the Trans-
Alaska pipeline to guarantee a continuous domestic supply of oil to
United States markets. In turn, in the face of potentially adverse
environmental effects, Congress subordinated full consideration of the
route argue that it would be superior to an all-Alaskan route because it (1)
would be subject to fewer environmental stresses and would avoid a zone of
intense earthquake activity associated with the Trans-Alaskan route, (2) would
be a more logical "common corridor" for combined oil and gas development in
Alaska and Canada, (3) would avoid ocean pollution associated with port and
terminal facilities that are part of the Trans-Alaskan system, (4) would deliver
oil to the U.S. markets east of the Rocky Mountains, which are in short supply,
rather than to the West Coast where oversupply caused by input from a trans-
Alaskan pipeline could eventually produce a misallocation of natural resources,
and (5) would be economically superior to a trans-Alaskan route. See generally
Cicchetti, The Wrong Route, 15 ENVIRONMENT, June 1973, at 4; N.Y. Times
Mag., supra note 3, at 99; Hearings on H.R. 9130 Before the Subcomm. on
Public Lands of the Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 2, at 627, 659 (1973) (statements of S. David Freeman, Charles J. Cicchetti
and Richard D. Nehring).
In a letter published in 245 HARPERS, Dec. 1972, at 8, Secretary Morton stated
why he favored the Trans-Alaskan route: (1) environmental problems are present
in both routes; (2) a trans-Alaskan route is shorter and crosses less permafrost
area than a trans-Canadian route; (3) a trans-Alaskan pipeline would take three
years to build, compared with five years for a trans-Canadian pipeline; (4) the
West Coast can consume all of the oil transported by the Trans-Alaskan pipeline
without displacing other domestically produced oil; (5) the trans-Canadian
pipeline will add to the United States' balance of payments problems because it
will be required to carry a significant percentage of Canadian owned oil, and it is
not in the national interest to purchase Canadian oil at the expense of Alaskan oil
that is available.
Secretary Morton also stated that the Canadian insistence of 51% ownership of
the line would be "unacceptable from the point of view of our national interests."
NEwswEEx, Apr. 16, 1973, at 84.
39. See 119 CoNG. REc. S12,805 (daily ed. July 9, 1973) (remarks of Senator
Henry Jackson): "I am afraid . .. if we once establish such a precedent (of a
congressional determination of adequacy of an environmental impact statement],
that each Member of the Congress will ask and expect a legislative waiver of
NEPA on his own special projects, and I do not want to open that door and
establish that precedent." See e.g., Energy Supply and Environmental Coordi-
nation Act of 1974 § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 791, amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857, allowing
temporary suspension of emission limitations under the Clean Air Act and exempt-
ing EPA from filing environmental impact statements on any action taken under
NEPA.
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environmental issues. Despite full utilization of technical advances
and the most stringent regulation, oil pollution damage to coastal and
adjacent landowners is inevitable.40
The central environmental concern is the potentially deleterious
effects of transporting heated oil through 800 miles of Alaskan terrain
and then by tanker to its West Coast market destination. Serious
problems are presented by the project's possible effect on Alaskan
permafrost, 41 wildlife, tundra animals, vegetation and soil. Equally
serious is the threat of oil pollution caused by pipeline leakage and
vessel discharge.
A. The Permafrost Problem
Permafrost, covering 85 percent of Alaska, presents the most serious
Arctic engineering problems. Attempts to contend with it have re-
sulted in spectacular and costly failure.4 2 It is suggested that the Trans-
Alaska pipeline, maintained at 158-176 degrees Fahrenheit, would
thaw the surrounding permafrost, creating a "veritable quagmire
incapable of supporting any structure whatsoever." 43 Such a geo-
physical result would obviously threaten the structural stability of
the pipeline, which in turn could spill up to 90,000 barrels of oil
in a single break.44 Once the permafrost's natural equilibrium is
upset, the thawing process may become self-perpetuating and impos-
sible to reverse.45
40. See Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 21, at 1064.
41. Permafrost is rock or soil material, with or without interior moisture or
organic matter, that has remained below 32 degrees fahrenheit continuously for
two or more years. Moxness, The Long Pipe, 12 ENVIRONMENT, Sept. 1970, at 18
[hereinafter cited as The Long Pipe].
42. See T. BROWN, supra note 4, at 58. "The stresses and strains induced by
the freezing, thawing, and heaving of permafrost soils subjected to unexpected
temperature changes turned railroads into roller coasters and bridges into jigsaw
puzzles." The Long Pipe, supra note 41, at 18. The 400 mile "Hickel Highway"
from Fairbanks to the Arctic Ocean was built through permafrost to enable pas-
sage of trucks carrying drilling equipment to the North Slope. The original cost,
estimated at $125,000, soon reached 1 million dollars. The road was so poorly
constructed that after the first winter it was completely impassable. NATION,
supra note 18, at 747. See generally T. BROWN, supra note 4, at 39-46.
43. Lachenbruch, Some Estimates of the Thermal Effects of a Heated Pipeline
in Permafrost, quoted in The Long Pipe, supra note 41, at 18, 21. Lachenbruch
estimates that a pipeline 48 inches in diameter, buried sb feet deep in permafrost
and heated to 176 degrees Fahrenheit would thaw a cylindrical region around
the pipeline 20 to 30 feet in diameter in a few years. Id. at 21.
44. N.Y. Times Mag., supra note 3, at 90.
45. The Long Pipe, supra note 41, at 21.
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The Department of the Interior suggests several methods to reduce
the risk of permafrost degradation: construction of nearly one-half
the pipeline above ground in certain areas; utilization of gravel pads
to protect the permafrost from construction activity; and general
project supervision by the federal government. 4 Yet the elevated
portion of the pipeline may result in a "combined barrier effect"
disturbing the migration of caribou, moose and mountain sheep.
Such a barrier could prevent these animals from reaching calving
and grazing grounds and result in population reduction.47
B. Earthquakes
The southern two-thirds of the Trans-Alaska pipeline route traverses
several major fault zones and seismically active regions. 48 The pipeline
will cross three faults along which two dozen significant earthquakes
have been reported in this century.49 Only ten years ago a major
earthquake in southern Alaska caused a tidal wave that destroyed the
old town of Valdez, the pipeline's proposed terminal? 0 The seismically
active regions would have been largely circumvented by a trans-
Canadian route.51
Surface faulting creates a major risk of pipeline rupture. Since one
mile of pipeline will contain 500,000 gallons of hot oil,52 even one
46. Note, Evolving Judicial Standards Under the National Environmental Policy
Act and the Challenge of the Alaska Pipeline, 81 YALE L.J. 1592, 1614 (1972)
(setting forth Department of the Interior Environmental Stipulations).
47. Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 21, at 1014 (4 Final Impact Statement (FIS)
157-161). See also Weeden & Klein, Wildlife and Oil: A Survey of Critical Issues
in Alaska, in ALAsxA PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 5, at 242. Wild animals may also
be threatened by wet areas underlaid by permafrost, which may produce a mire
that would trap animals attempting to cross it. Id. at 243. See generally Letter
from A. Smith (President, General Counsel of National Parks and Conservation
Assoc.) to Hon. J. Melcher (Chairman Subcomm. on Public Lands), June 7, 1973,
in Hearings on H.R. 9130 Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 768-69 (1973) (stating
that with respect to the caribou migration problem, among others, the Canadian
route is superior to the Alaskan route).
To mitigate migration disruption, the pipeline builders will provide caribou
crossings by dipping the line under the tundra at intervals; refrigeration stations
will be set up at those points to keep the ground artificially frozen and to prevent
the line from thawing the permafrost. Barron's, supra note 11, at 24.
48. Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 21, at 1015 (3 FIS 20).
49. NATION, supra note 18, at 749.
50. Id.
51. See note 38 supra.
52. The Long Pipe, supra note 41, at 16.
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such rupture would cause extensive damage. Despite the creation of
a cutoff valve system to halt the flow of oil in the event of a break,53
delay in operation and drainage could cause substantial pollution."4
Moreover, the use of dispersants and detergents to remove spilled oil
from terrestrial surfaces can be extremely destructive to vegetation
and marine life.-5 Other clean-up methods, such as booms and suction
devices, have proven ineffective.56
C. Marine Inpact of Oil Spills
After the oil is pumped through the pipeline from Prudhoe Bay to
the port of Valdez, it will be transferred to tankers for transportation
to West Coast refineries in Washington and California. Tanker trans-
portation creates the added threat of oil spills, and spills in arctic
waters are especially problematic since oil disperses more slowly in
cold water.57
53. In addition to the cutoff valve system, the Department of the Interior
attempts to minimize the danger from seismically active areas by requiring (1)
that the pipeline be able to withstand large scale earthquakes "where technically
feasible", (2) that Alyeska satisfy federal officials "that all recognizable or rea-
sonably inferrable faults or fault zones along the alignment have been identified
and delineated", and (3) that the pipeline be constructed to withstand a minimum
of two feet of horizontal or vertical set off. Note, Evolving Judicial Standards
Under the National Environmental Policy Act and the Challenge of the Alaska
Pipeline, supra note 46, at 1617.
To mitigate pipeline rupture from earthquake hazards, Alyeska will lay the
pipeline in a zig-zag pattern, allowing it to stretch horizontally. Also, the pipe
itself will be made of a special ductile steel, capable of bending or wrinkling
without cracking. Barron's, supra note 11, at 24.
54. In the event of a pipeline rupture, 14,000 barrels of oil could leak out
during the time required for a pump station shutdown and valve closure. After
shutdown and closure up to 50,000 additional barrels of oil could drain from
the pipeline at some locations. With smaller leaks, 750 barrels of oil could be
lost every day without being detected. NATION, supra note 18, at 749.
55. See Comment, Oil Pollution of the Sea, 10 HAnv. INT'L L.J. 316, 355-56
(1969). In the Torrey Canyon disaster, note 58 infra, studies showed that oil
accounted for destruction of 30% of the plankton, while detergents used in at-
tempting to dissipate the oil killed off 95% of the remaining plankton along the
British Coast. W. Ross, OIL POLLUTION AS AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM, 9
(1973) [hereinafter cited as W. Ross]. The toxicity of detergents has been suffi-
ciently established to compel the President's Panel on Oil Spills to recommend that
their use be strictly limited. First Report of the President's Panel on Oil Spills,
The Oil Spill Problem 11 (1969) (Office of Science and Technology).
56. See Bcrgman, No Fault Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 5 J. MARTIIE
L. 1, 4 (1973). See also N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1970, at 22, col. 2.
57. Bergman, supra note 56, at 7 n.30.
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The Department of the Interior estimates that in an average year
as much as 140,000 barrels of oil may be spilled into West Coast
waters as a result of tanker casualties.58 Additional quantities would
likely be pumped into ocean waters during tank cleanup operations;5"
and there could be a chronic pollution of Prince William Sound caused
by continual discharge of oil from a ballast treatment plant at the
port of Valdez.60 Oil tanker traffic is expected to increase significantly
when the pipeline is built. North Slope oil will add about 70 tanker
calls per year in Puget Sound when pipeline operations begin further
increasing the threat of oil pollution.-'
The most obvious and immediate effect of oil spills on the marine
environment is the destruction of birds and fish.G5 Over 25,000 birds
58. Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 21, at 10 (4 FIS 474). It is estimated that the
Alyeska Pipeline Service Company's fleet would have an average of 1.69 collisions
or groundings each year. NATION, supra note 18, at 749.
In the March 1967 wreck of the supertanker Torrey Canyon nearly one-half
of the 118,000 tons of the tanker's crude oil cargo was released, contaminating
the coast of Great Britain and France and destroying innumerable fish and fowl.
See generally E. COWAN, OIL AND WATER: THE TORREY CANYON DISASTER
(1968); Nanda, The "Torrey Canyon" Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44 DENVER
L.J. 400 (1967); Nanda & Stiles, Offshore Oil Spills: An Evaluation of Recent
United States Responses, 7 SAN DiEGo L. REV. 519 (1970).
As a result of a collision of two oil tankers in January 1971, approximately
840,000 gallons of oil spilled into San Francisco Bay. Immediate clean-up opera-
tions resulted in recovery of some 411,000 gallons of oil; the bulk of the oil floated
out to sea forming an enormous 50 mile oil slick. Another tanker ran aground in
fog and light snow on January 23, 1971, at the mouth of New Haven Harbor,
spilling 385,000 gallons of oil into Long Island Sound. See Recent Developments
in the Law of the Seas II: A Synopsis, 8 SAN DEO L. REv. 658, 666-67 (1971).
59. Experts foresee that a total of 613,000 barrels of oil will be spilled each year
from tanker collisions, illegal tank cleanings at sea, and accidental discharges in
port and at sea. This is the equivalent of twelve major collisions. NATIoN, supra
note 18, at 749.
60. An estimated twelve barrels of oil will be pumped into upper Prince William
Sound every day from tanker deballasting. Weeden & Klein, supra note 47, at 245.
For a discussion of common deballasting and cleanup practices see Comment, Oil
Pollution of the Sea, supra note 55, at 319-20.
61. W. Ross, supra note 55, at 217. Congress enacted the Ports and Water-
ways Safety Act of 1972, 46 U.S.C. §§ 391(a), 1221-27 (Supp. III, 1973), to
establish for all United States vessels, or vessels entering the navigable waters of
the United States, comprehensive minimum standards of design, construction,
alteration, repair, maintenance and operation to prevent or mitigate the hazards
of tanker discharge to life, property and the marine environment. The Ports and
Waterways Safety Act applies to all vessels that have on board oil cargo of any
kind. Id. § 391(a) (2) (B).
62. The pipeline, in addition to the tankers, threatens the marine environment.
As a result of the pipeline's proximity to several streams, biologists fear that large
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were killed as a result of the Torrey Canyon disaster,63 10,000 died
after a spill from an unidentified source in Alaska's Kodiak Islands
area, 14 and thousands of dead birds were found onshore after spills
at Santa Barbara.0 Moreover, oil spills are almost certain to result
in damage to coastal and adjacent property owners, with resulting
commercial and recreational losses.36
III. SECTION 1653:
STRICT LIABILITY REMEDY FOR OIL POLLUTION CLAIMANTS
The Trans-Alaska Authorization Act imposes a standard of strict
liability on the owners of the pipeline right-of-way for all injuries
and damages incurred in connection with or resulting from activities
along or near the right-of-way.- Further, owners and operators of
oil tankers carrying Alaskan oil transported through the pipeline are
strictly liable for damages to all injured parties resulting from oil
spillage pollution.8 Congress recognized that unless the costs of oil
pollution are regarded as an element of the cost of delivery of oil to
amounts of silt may enter these streams to the detriment of grayling and salmon
populations. Weeden & Klein, supra note 47, at 243. Also, bed scour and bank
erosion at stream crossings can rupture the pipeline, Plaintiff's Brief, supra note
21, at 1016 (1 FIS Summary Sheet), spilling tons of oil into these streams. See
W. Ross, supra note 55, at 8.
63. See note 58 supra.
64. Baldwin, Public Policy on Oil: An Ecological Perspectve, I ECOLOGY L.Q.
245, 262 (1971).
65. Id. See generally A. NASH, D. MANN & P. OLSEN, OIL POLLUTION AND
THE PUSLIC INTEREST: A STUDY Or THE SANTA BARBARA OIL S-TLL 21-27 (1972);
Baldwin, The Santa Barbara Oil Spill, 42 U. CoLo. L. REv. 33 (1970).
66. The elect of major catastrophic oil spills on fish, water fowl, wildlife,
and the quality of our waters and beaches, is all too apparent. . . . Shell-
fish have been found to contain a variety of pathogens; pollution has closed
a portion of the world's commercial shellfish beds; beaches and bays have
been closed to bathers and other recreational use; lifeless zones have been
created in the marine environment; there have been heavy kills of fish and
other organisms; and an identifiable portion of the marine Eco system has
been profoundly changed.
S. REP. No. 92-724, in 2 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEws 2768, 2769 (1972) (Ports
and Waternays Safety Act of 1972).
67. 43 U.S.C. § 1653 (Supp. III, 1973).
68. Id. Strict liability under the Act ceases when the oil has first been brought
ashore at a port under the jurisdiction of the United States. Id. § 1653(b)(7).
Strict liability is imposed because "existing maritime law would not provide ade-
quate compensation to all victims, inclfiding residents of Canada, in the event of
the kind of catastrophe which might occur." CONG. REP. No. 93-624, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 8 (1973).
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the market, they would fall unfairly on Alaskan citizens or others
living in the vicinity.69
Damages caused by an act of war, the negligence of a govern-
mental unit, or the damaged party are not covered by the strict liability
provisions.70 There being no exemption for acts of God, the holder
of the pipeline right-of-way and the vessel operator or owner will
be strictly liable for damage by earthquakes or tidal waves.71
The holder of the pipeline right-of-way may be strictly liable up to
50,000,000 dollars for any one incident. Ordinary rules of negligence
determine his liability for damages in excess of that amount.7 2 The
vessel owner and operator may be strictly liable for the first 14,000,000
dollars in damages arising from any one incident.7 3 The Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Liability Fund, consisting of money collected by the pipeline
operator from the owner of the oil at a fee of five cents per barrel, 74
is subject to claims up to the 100,000,000 dollar maximum liability.7r
Furthermore, the polluter is responsible for the expense of controlling
and removing the pollutant.76
69. I-.R. REP. No. 93-414, supra note 28, at 18.
70. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1653(a)(1), (c)(2) (Supp. III, 1973).
71. Release of defendant from strict liability for an act of God traditionally is
based on the premise that the act was an unforeseeable intervening force of nature.
See, e.g., Eikland v. Casey, 266 F. 821, 824 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 254 U.S.
652 (1920): "[A]ct of God, in its legal sense, applies only to events in nature so
extraordinary that the history of climatic variations and other conditions in the
particular locality affords no reasonable warning of them." The possibility and
effects of earthquake and tidal wave occurrence were thoroughly examined in the
Department of the Interior's environmental impact statements and are thus fore-
seeable natural occurrences in Alaska and the Arctic. But see Alaska Department
of Environmental Compensation Act, ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822(1) (D) (Cum.
Supp. 1973) (relieving defendant from strict liability if he can prove an act of
God, defined as an "act of nature which is unforeseeable in kind or degree," id.
§ 46.03.826(1) ).
72. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(a)(2) (Supp. III, 1973).
73. Id. § 1653(c) (3).
74. Id. §§ 1653(c) (4)-(6). The Fund, administered by right-of-way holders,
consists of 100 million dollars. In Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental
Improvement Comm'n, 307 A.2d 1, 14-26 (Me.), appeal dismissed, 414
U.S. 1035 (1973), the court upheld the constitutionality of Maine's Coastal
Conveyance Act of 1970, which imposes an annual license fee of one-half cent
per barrel on operators of oil terminal facilities receiving shipments of oil by sea.
For a discussion of the benefits of an International Fund for Compensation
for Oil Pollution Damage see W. Ross, supra note 55, at 186-88.
75. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1653(c) (1), (3) (Supp. III, 1973).
76. Id. § 1653(b). If the holder fails to remove the pollutant adequately,
the Secretary, in cooperation with other agencies or the holder, can accomplish
the control ana removal at the holder's expense. Under § 1653(c)(1), the
vessel owner and Fund are liable for clean up costs as part of the damages.
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The Act also requires a right-of-way holder to provide emergency
subsistence and other aid to affected persons and local organizations
pending the ultimate determination of their pollution claim against
the holder . 7 This special "no fault" liability affords a means of pro-
riding food, water and medical aid should a disaster occur during
construction of the pipeline that cannot adequately be met by a right
to sue for damages. 78
IV. OIL POLLUTION LIABILITY: THE NEED FOR STRICT LIABILITY
While the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act imposes strict liability solely
on those associated with the transportation of Alaskan oil through the
pipeline and aboard tankers, the Act sets the stage for the imposition
ot strict liability for damages resulting from all oil transport by pipe-
line or tanker from any location.
Federal statutes holding the polluter strictly liable to the federal
government for deanup costs have no effect on liability for damage
to public and private parties from discharges of oil.7 Moreover,
traditional common law remedies for oil pollution damage are inade-
(tuate to protect injured parties because of the difficulties in proving
a case against the polluter. Only a standard of strict liability can
ilure adequate protection.
Legal commentators have considered oil transport an ultrahazardous
activity, warranting imposition of strict liability for pollution dam-
77. Id. § 1653(a) (4).
78. H.R. REP. No. 93-414, supra note 28, at 17-18. Section 1653(a)(1) also
gives the natives the option to sue in court or agree to arbitration under Alaska's
arbitration law, which is a much less expensive proceeding. Id. at 18.
79. E.g., Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1155-56,
1158, 1160-75 (1970). State strict liability statutes differ with respect to pro-
tection. E.g., Alaska Department of Environmental Compensation Act, ALASKA
STAT. §§ 46.03.822-.824 (Cum. Supp. 1973) (strict liability for the discharge
of hazardous substances, including damages for injury or loss to persons, property,
income, means of producing income, and loss of economic benefit); Florida Oil
Spill Prevention & Pollution Control Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 376.011-.12 (1974)
(strict liability to state for oil discharge); Maine Oil Discharge Prevention &
Pollution Control Act, ME. REv. STAT. AN,. tit. 38 §§ 541, 552 (Supp. 1973)
(strict liability to state for oil pollution damage); Maryland Water Resources
Law, MD. ANN. CODE art. 96A, § 29BC (1974) ("The person responsible for
the oil spillage shall be liable to any other person for any damage to his real or
personal property directly caused by the spillage"); see Askew v. American
Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, rehearing denied, 412 U.S. 933 (1973)
(Florida law upheld against federal pre-emption challenges); Portland Pipe Line
Corp. v. Environmental Improvement Comm'n, 307 A.2d I (Me.), appeal dis-
missed, 414 U.S. 1035 (1973).
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ages. 0 Nevertheless, recovery for oil pollution damage in courts of
common and maritime law is generally based on traditional common
law concepts of trespass, nuisance and negligence.81
A. Common Law Remedies
Under traditional rules, plaintiff has the burden of proving negli-
gence or intentionally inflicted harm in order to recover for damage
resulting from oil discharge under a trespass theory. Since trespass
liability requires an actual physical invasion of the property,82 recovery
may be denied to non-beachfront owners for loss of business due to
polluted beaches.8 3
Nuisance- 4 connotes a continuing or recurring interference with a
real property interest over a considerable period of time.8 Therefore,
recovery under this theory may be unavailable to claimants whose
damages arise from a single instance of a vessel's discharge of oil.80
80. See, e.g., T. PosT, PRIVATE COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES SUSTAINED f3Y
THE DISCHARGE OF OIL FROAM VESSELS ON THE NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE
UNITED STATES (1972) (Sea Grant Tech. Bull. No. 22) [hereinafter cited as T.
POST]; W. Ross, supra note 55, at 186-88; Avins, Absolute Liability for Oil
Spillage, 36 BROOKLYN L. REV. 359 (1970); Bergman, No Fault Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage, 5 J. MARITIMEF L. 1 (1973); Mendelsohn, Maritime Liability
for Oil Pollution -Domestic and International Law, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1
(1969); Shutler, Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 7 HOUSTON L. REV. 415 (1970);
Sweeney, Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 155 (1968).
81. An owner may also incur liability by operating an unseaworthy vessel, i.e.
one not reasonably fit for its intended use. The owner's duty to furnish a sea-
worthy ship is absolute and completely independent of his duty, under a negligence
theory, to exercise reasonable care. Cf. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400
U.S. 494 (1971); Mitchell v. Trawler Racer Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960). But see
Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972).
82. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 594 (4th ed. 1971).
83. Shutler, supra note 80, at 435.
84. A nuisance may be public or private. A public nuisance causes incon-
venience or damage to the public at large and is subject to criminal prosecution.
A private nuisance is an interference with the use and enjoyment of property
of an individual or a few persons and is actionable for either abatement or
damages, or both. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 82-88.
The Supreme Court has recently recognized a federal common law of nuisance to
abate air and water pollution. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
85. Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060, 1068 (D. Md. 1972).
86. Compare id. (single oil spill in navigable waters did not amount to
common law nuisance), with A. NASH et. al., supra note 65, at 88 ("a state forum
undoubtedly could find sufficient 'continuity' in over 500 days of spill . . . to
constitute a public nuisance."). See also T. PosT, supra note 80, at 31.
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A nuisance action is available when the polluter's activity interferes
with plaintiff's use and enjoyment of the land 87 and therefore is appro-
priate, as is trespass, for the beachfront owner damaged by discharged
oil,- or the riparian owner whose rights are similarly impaired. 5
Nuisance, like trespass, may be of little value, however, to the non-
beachfront owner seeking to recover business profits lost as a result
of an oil spill.90 Furthermore, recovery for nuisance may depend on
plaintiff's ability to prove that he has been injured in some special
way not suffered by the general public.91
Negligence, the principal vehicle for recovering damages caused by
oil pollution, places a particularly onerous burden of proof on injured
parties to show a breach of the duty of care by owners or operators of
tankers./2 The injured party's greatest problem may be proving the
existence of the actual cause of the damage93 if he resides near busy
shipping lanes,c'1 or the proximate cause (foreseeability) 95 of the
87. District of Columbia v. Totten, 5 F.2d 374, 380 (D.D.C.), cert. denied,
269 U.S. 562 (1925); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 832 (1939).
88. T. POST, supra note 80, at 32.
89. E.g., Petition of New Jersey Barging Corp., 168 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y.
1958). But cf. Oppen v. Aetna Insurance Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973).
90. T. POST, supra note 80, at 32. In Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp.
247 (S.D. Me. 1973), commercial fishermen and clam diggers, alleging inter-
ference with their public right to fish and dig clams, were entitled to sue parties
responsible for oil spillage into Casco Bay, while businessmen in the bay area,
claiming loss of customers from pollution of the coastal waters, were denied such
an action. The former alleged a direct interference with a public right while the
latter did not. Id. at 250-51.
91. See Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (S.D. Me. 1973).
92. See Avins, supra note 80, at 366. The vessel manufacturer may be at fault
for negligent construction of one of the vessel's crucial components, or it may be
that the vessel operator breached his duty of due care by omitting to keep a
proper lookout.
93. See Salaky v. Atlas Tank Processing Corp., 120 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd sub norn. Salaky v. The Atlas Barge No. 3, 208 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1953);
cf. Davis v. Cities Service Oil Co., 420 F.2d 1278 (10th Cir. 1970). But see
California v. S.S. Bournemouth. 318 F. Supp. 839 (C.D. Calif. 1970) (although
the State failed to produce evidence of the actual cause of the harbor spill, con-
ditions of wind and tide combined with expert chemical analysis of the oil
indicated defendant vessel was the source).
94. Sw.eeney, supra note 80, at 166.
95. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. The Miller S.S. Co. [1966) 3 W.L.R.
498 (C.A.), Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co.
Ltd. L.R. (1961] A.C. 388; see Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. Tisdale, 366
P.2d 614 (Okla. 1961).
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damage, particularly if he is a non-beachfront owner.5 Furthermore.
the shipowner or operator generally has sole access to the evidence
concerning the oil discharge. 97 As a result of the difficulties facing
the injured property owner, litigation may be so lengthy, expensive
and complex that the injured party will be forced to absorb his own
loss.
The same problems of proving fault for pollution by vessel discharge
are present in pipeline leaks or bursts that pollute the surrounding
property.98 While most courts apply traditional negligence principles
to impose liability for damages caused by leaks from oil and gas pipe-
lines or storage tanks,99 some jurisdictions hold polluters absolutely
liable under various legal theories.100 When subterranean waters are
96. Shutler, supra note 80, at 435.
97. When only shipowners or operators have access to needed information, a
possi'ble vehicle for recovery is res ipsa loquitur, which usually requires that (1)
an oil spill of that type would not ordinarily occur unless someone had been
negligent, (2) at the time of the injury the specific instrumentality is in the
exclusive control of the party charged, (3) the injured party was not negligent,
and (4) defendant has access to the evidence and plaintiff does not. Sce 2 F,
HARPER& F. JAmEs, TORTS §§ 19.6-.9 (1956); J. WIGMORE, EvDNcn 2509
(3d ed. 1940). Compare California v. S.S. Bournemouth, 318 F. Supp. 839
(C.D. Calif. 1970), with Bianchini v. Humble Pipe Line Co., 3 ENVIRONMENTAL
L. RPTR. 20385 (5th Cir. 1973).
98. Fault may be with the manufacturer of the pipeline, or with those who
constructed the pipeline or planned its route. A defect could exist in the pump
station mechanism or in the automatic shut off valve system or the negligence
may lie entirely with the pump station operator.
99. Maher v. Cities Service Pipeline Co., 286 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1960)
(applying Kansas law); Todd v. The Prairie Pipe Line Co., 108 Kan. 485, 196
P. 623 (1921): Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Duke, 313 Ky. 498, 232 S.W.2d 348
(1950); Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 327 Mo. 238, 37 S.W.2d 518 (1931);
McMirrv v. The Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 159 Mo. App. 623, 141 S.W. 463 (1911);
Meddock v. National Transit Co., 105 Pa. Super. 553, 161 A. 628 (1932);
Scurlock Oil Co. v. Roberts, 370 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). The duty
New Mexico Pipe Line Co. v. McIntyre, 430 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968);
Scurlock Oil Co. v. Roberts, 370 S.W.2d 755 (Tex Civ. App. 1963). The duty
of care imposed by the courts on the pipeline owner or operator includes the duty
to make reasonable inspections of the pipeline and right-of-way. Weekly aerial
inspections of gas or oil pipelines or rights-of-way is accepted as standard practice
by pipeline companies. See Phillips Pipe Line Co. v. Razo, 420 S.W.2d 691
(Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
100. Many courts impose absolute liability using a nuisance theory. Helms v.
The Eastern Kansas Oil Co., 102 Kan. 164, 169 P. 208 (1917); Hauck v. Tide
Water Pipe Line Co., 153 Pa. 366, 26 A. 644 (1893); Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v.
O'Mahoney, 60 S.W. 902 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900). See generally Annot., 75 A.L.R.
1325 (1931).
Other courts apply the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868),
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polluted by oil or gas escaping from pipelines, courts have repeatedly
held the owner or operator absolutely liable.1 1
B. Oil Transport as an Ultrahazardous Activity
The significant risks involved in the construction, maintenance and
operation of pipelines, and in the transportation of oil by tanker, lead
to the conclusion that these ultrahazardous activities warrant the im-
position of strict liability for the damage they cause.
The potential harm from oil pollution is typically associated with
the oil transport business and is thus calculable and reasonably in-
surable.152 Since such damages are foreseeable when the hazardous
which status that a person isho, for his own purposes, brings on his lands and
collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep
it at hi, peril, and that he is prima facie liable for all damages that are the
natural consequences of its escape. See Helms v. The Eastern Kansas Oil Co.,
102 Kan. 164, 169 P. 208 (1917); Hauck v. Tide Water Pipe Line Co., 153
Pa. 366, 26 A. 644 (1893). Texas Co. v. Earles, 164 S.W. 28 (Tex. Civ. App.
1914). Texa.s Co. v. Giddings, 148 S.W. 1142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912). But
see King v. Columbian Carbon Co., 152 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1945); Turner v.
Big Lake Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W.2d 221 (1936).
Other theories of liability are assumption of liability by the grantee in easement
agreements, e.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Myrick, 61 So. 2d 475
(Miss. 1951): Premier Petroleum Co v. Box, 255 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. Civ. App.
1953): nuisance per se statutes, e.g., LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 667 (West 1952);
see Diagle v. Continental Oil Co., 277 F. Supp. 875 (W.D. La. 1967); Atlantic
Pipe Line Co. v. Dredge Philadelphia, 247 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Pa. 1965), aff'd,
366 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1966), or ultiahazardous activity, McLane v. Northwest
Natural Gas Co., 255 Ore. 324, 467 P.2d 635 (1970) (storage of liquified natural
gas in aboveground tank in a settled area held an abnormally dangerous activity
giving rise to strict liability for death of workman working on tank); see Luth-
ringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
101. E.g., Sussex Land & Live Stock Co. v. Midwest Refining Go., 294 F.
597 (8th Cir. 1923); Helms v. Eastern Kansas Oil Co., 102 Kan. 164, 169 P.
208 (1917); Texas Co. v. Giddings, 148 S.W. 1142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912). But
see Kennedy v. Brandenburg, 470 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
Liability, absent proof of negligence, has also been approved for damage re-
sulting from harmful gases or fumes arising in connection with oil refineries,
tanks and pipelines. See, e.g., Great N. Refining Co. v. Lutes, 190 Ky. 451, 227
S.W. 795 (1921); Xforgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 77 S.E.2d 682
(1953); Vautier v. Atlantic Refining Co., 231 Pa. 8, 79 A. 814 (1911); Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Vestal, 231 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950), aff'd, 149 Tex. 487,
235 S.W.2d 440 (1951).
102. See A. EURENZWEia, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT 56 (1951).
The oil companies know that they are taking a calculated risk in transporting
oil by these means, and that the potential damages to be caused by oil spills
are great. . . . The oil companies are willing to take this risk, because of
the financial benefits they will get from exploration of the North Slope oil
resources. If they are to reap the benefits, they must also be required to pay
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activity begins,103 liability to injured parties is merely a cost of doing
business. Oil production and transportation are financed through
heavily insured, global corporations who are better able to absorb
and distribute the costs of pollution than are plaintiffs in the typical
common law action against polluters. Rather than falling unfairly
on certain individuals, risk distribution among all oil users would
cause less economic dislocation.1 04
Transport of oil by pipelines and tankers involves an enormous
risk of harm that cannot be eliminated by the exercise of reasonable
care. The potential for damage from spilled oil is great. Because
relatively few persons are engaged in these activities, they are not a
matter of common usage.' 05 Transportation of oil through and to
populated ports or cities, where both pipeline and vessel discharge
of oil could create substantial damage, make the activities inappropriate
to the place where they are carried on. Moreover, the potential oil
the price of a disastrous oil spill .... [T]he fact that [the pipeline holder or
tanker owner] is responsible for transporting the oil to begin with means that
he has provided the conditions under which the oil spill can occur, and thus
should be absolutely liable for damages.
119 CONG. REc. S13,668 (Daily ed. July 17, 1973).
103. A. EURENZWEIG, supra note 102, at 50. But see Bianchini v. Humble Pipe
Line Co., 3 ENVIRONMENTAL L. RPTR. 20385 (5th Cir. 1973) (pipeline company
not strictly liable for damage to oyster reefs resulting from an oil spill caused by
a vessel's accidental rupture of an underseas pipeline when the damage did not
result from any negligence by defendant in the placement, maintenance or opera-
tion of the pipeline but was caused solely by the unforeseeable intervening force
of an unknown marine vessel).
104. See W. Ross, supra note 55, at 186. "The cost of an injury and the loss
of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and
a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and
distributed among the public as a cost of doing business." Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., con-
curring); cf. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17 (1965). See generally Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution
and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Freezer, Capacity to Bear Loss
as a Factor in the Decision of Certain Types of Tort Cases, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 805
(1930); Freezer, Social Justice in the Field of Torts, 11 MINN. L. REV. 313
(1927); Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J.
1172 (1952).
105. An activity is a "matter of common usage" if it is "customarily carried
on by the great mass of mankind or by many people in the community." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520, comment d (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
In excluding oil wells from this definition, the Institute states, ". . . the very
nature of oil lands and the essential interest of the public in the production of
oil require that oil wells be drilled, but the dangers incident thereto are charac-
teristic of oil lands and not lands in general." Id.
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pollution damage from oil pipelines and tankers is foreseeable in light
of the numerous mishaps in the past. In sum, the hazards of oil trans-
port indicate that this activity contains inherently abnormal risks
sufficient to make it ultrahazardous under the Restatement of Torts
definition. 03
Under a strict liability standard, injured fishermen and property
owners would be relieved of their burden of proving fault on the part
of the oil polluter and would be required to prove only that the oil
106. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519 (1939). THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS establishes six criteria for an abnormally dangerous activity: (1) the
activity involves a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattels of others, (2) the gravity of the harm that may result from it is likely
to be great, (3) the risk cannot be eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care,
(4) the activity is not a matter of common usage, (5) the activity is inappropriate
to the place where it is carried on, and (6) the value of the activity to the com-
munity. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519 & 520 (Tent. Draft No. 10,
1964). RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520, comment c (1939), includes drilling an
oil well as an ultrahazardous activity because "there's always a chance that in
drilling an oil well a gusher will be struck which . . . will do serious harm to
the lower lands in the vicinity." The Institute expressed no opinion as to whether
the construction and use of a large tank or artificial reservoir in which a large
body of fluid is collected is or ;s not an ultrahazardous activity. But see RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520, Note 3 (Tent. Draft No. 103 1964) (storage of
gasoline or other inflammable liquid in populated area a matter of strict liability).
See also McLane v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 255 Ore. 324, 327, 467 P.2d
635, 637 (1970). A number of conditions and activities have been considered
abnormally dangerous by imposing unreasonable risks to the community. E.g.,
Britton v. Harrison Constr. Co., 87 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.W. Va. 1950) (storage of
explosives); Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948) (fumiga-
tion), Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928) (drill-
ing oil wells or operating refineries in thickly settled communities); Sachs v.
Chait, 281 Minn. 540, 162 N.W.2d 243 (1968) (pile driving); Banks v. Maxwell,
205 N.C. 233, 171 S.E. 70 (1933) (keeping a dangerous animal); McLane v.
Northwest Natural Gas Co., 255 Ore. 324, 467 P.2d 635 (1970) (liquefied gas
stored in tank in populated area); Loe v. Lenhardt, 277 Ore. 242, 362 P.2d 312
(1961) (crop dusting); Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868) (water
collected in quantity in a dangerous place or allowed to percolate). In view of the
courts' decisions in the above cases, it has been forcefully asserted that the transport
of oil is an abnormally dangerous activity:
The bringing of large quantities of oil onto the ocean, although a normal
and useful economic activity, is fraught with special risk in case of damage
to the tanker. There is no difference in principle between the storage of
large quantities of water on the land and the storage of large quantities of
oil on the sea. If either escapes, it can cause harm. There is also no difference
in essence with the confinement of dangerous animals. Surely unchecked oil
in the sea can be more expensive to catch and confine than a wild animal
which has escaped its captors. The same thing can be said of escaping fire
or debris and shock from blasting. The spray from an airplane doing crop
dusting and escaping oil is also quite close.
Avins, supra note 80, at 366.
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spill caused the damage to their property. The imposition of strict
liability on vessel owners and operators may not only encourage
greater care on their part but also the improvement of ship and pipe-
line construction and design. Faced with higher insurance premiums
resulting from the higher risks insured, strict liability would provide
a strong incentive for oil companies to discover, develop and deploy
vessels and pipelines that would operate safely.1 07
CONCLUSION
Major oil companies have begun constructing the Trans-Alaska pipe-
line. Billions of barrels of oil will be transported from northern oil
fields to the southern coast of Alaska, then by vessel to the domestic
markets on the West Coast. Undoubtedly, as our energy needs in-
crease, so too will the number of oil pipelines and terminal facilities
necessary to accommodate the increasing production and transport of
oil. This development will in turn increase the potential for environ-
mental and property damage caused by oil pollution, whether from
leakage, discharge or catastrophe. The situation is precisely that con-
templated by Congress when it passed legislation providing adminis.
trative and judicial review of major projects entailing environmental
risks. Such review was to consider all possible adverse environmental
and ecological effects from the construction and operation of these
projects and examine alternatives to those actions that might reduce
the adverse risks and effects. Nevertheless, Congress, which has im-
posed these requirements in the National Environmental Policy
Act, limited their application in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authori-
zation Act. Whether Congress will limit the application of NEPA
whenever it determines that immediate energy needs outweigh the
need for a thorough examination of the environmental aspects of the
actions remains to be seen.
Although the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act limits per-
missible environmental inquiry, it may effectively protect and compen-
sate public and private parties for injuries resulting from oil pollution.
The strict liability provision of the Act is essental to meet the threat
of recurring oil spills, and the resulting lawsuits for millions of
dollars in property damage. Such damage, however, is probable
whenever oil is transported. It is therefore appropriate to reassess
the remedies available to a party injured by this inherently dangerous
107. See Bergman, supra note 80, at 38.
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activity. The strict liability remedy is especially necessary in view
of impending hazardous U. S. offshore oil drilling in which the same
threats of pollution prevail. Since the common law remedies for oil
pollution are no longer adequate to meet modern day circumstances,
a standard of strict liability is essential for the protection of injured
parties.
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